Temporal patterns in Wi-Fi packet bursts exist during network discovery

Our new passive identification method exploits predictable transmission timing between those bursts



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Passive Device Identification with Packet Timing Analysis

MAC Address Randomization



Wi-Fi devices search for Access Points by broadcasting probe requests with a random MAC address in the clear.



Even with MAC randomization activated, predictable patterns in network discovery enable other threats to user privacy:

- Unwanted surveillance across networks
- Learning people's locations and movements across space
- Compromising personal safety

How We Track Devices

The correlation outputs scores for time Time-shifted copies of a *base pattern* (top) for a sequence of bursts is correlated windows where probe requests in the with the *packet trace sequence* (bottom). sequence match the pattern.



Results from the burst interval attack

Device	Detection Rate	Burst Interval
Windows 10 Laptop	85.7%	59.7s ± 20ms
Raspberry Pi 3B+	96.8%	60.0s ± 25ms
Ubuntu 20.04 Laptop	100%	63.0s ± 30ms

Exploiting Inter-burst Timing

As devices broadcast probe requests, they embed predictable temporal patterns in transmission bursts.



The *burst interval* measurement serves as an identifier.

The set of MAC addresses in those time windows are considered belonging to the same device.



DOI: 10.1145/2939918.2939930

16:67:c1:04:39:bf 54:8a:53:be:1d:df c6:b8:d1:2a:a9:a5 9c:99:c4:cb:84:ea 8a:46:2b:f2:db:8d 36:74:9e:6c:f2:9c b6:1a:e9:06:f1:c4 a2:f1:dd:3b:32:82 2a:a0:d5:3b:53:72

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C. Matte, M. Cunche, F. Rousseau, and M. Vanhoef. Defeating MAC
Address Randomization Through Timing Attacks. In WiSec '16.
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